Institutional complementarities and corporate governance: The case of hostile takeover attempts

被引:3
作者
Zhou, Nan [1 ]
Guillen, Mauro F. [2 ]
机构
[1] Nankai Univ, Nankai Business Sch, Management Dept, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
corporate governance; institutional complementarities; hostile takeover attempts; INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS; GOLDEN PARACHUTES; POISON PILL; CORRUPTION; MARKET; STRATEGY; CONTINGENCIES; GLOBALIZATION; ACQUISITIONS; DIFFUSION;
D O I
10.1111/corg.12263
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Research Question/Issue Do institutions reinforce each other when it comes to shaping the economic and organizational environment? We investigate national institutional complementarities by examining how different types of institutions jointly influence the occurrence of hostile takeover attempts, a practice in corporate governance whose frequency differs across countries. We distinguish among regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutions and examine how they interact to influence the occurrence of hostile takeover attempts worldwide. Research Findings/Insights Using panel data on hostile takeover activity of 45 countries between 1988 and 2016, we find evidence supporting the impact of institutions individually and of institutional complementarities. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study shows that important corporate governance practices such as hostile takeover attempts are indeed influenced by different aspects of institutional environment. It thus helps us better understand the effectiveness of corporate governance practice across different countries. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study sheds new light on policies facilitating certain corporate governance practice such as hostile takeovers. It also provides managers with a tool to analyze the prevalence of hostile takeovers in a country.
引用
收藏
页码:82 / 97
页数:16
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