Circular Justification and Explanation in Aristotle

被引:7
作者
Goldin, Owen [1 ]
机构
[1] Marquette Univ, Dept Philosophy, Milwaukee, WI 53212 USA
来源
PHRONESIS-A JOURNAL FOR ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY | 2013年 / 58卷 / 03期
关键词
Aristotle; knowledge; understanding; foundationalism; coherentism; demonstration;
D O I
10.1163/15685284-12341248
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Aristotle's account of episteme is foundationalist. In contrast, the web of dialectical argumentation that constitutes justification for scientific principles is coherentist. Aristotle's account of explanation is structurally parallel to the argument for a foundationalist account of justification. He accepts the first argument but his coherentist accounts of justification indicate that he would not accept the second. Where is the disanalogy? For Aristotle, the intelligibility of a demonstrative premise is the cause of the intelligibility of a demonstrated conclusion and causation is asymmetric. Within the Posterior Analytics itself, Aristotle does not account for this, but elsewhere he develops the resources for doing so: the cause is what acts on a substrate to actualize a potential in that substrate, resulting in the effect. On the other hand, it may well happen that two propositions entail each other, in which case one may as well justify the one on the basis of the other as vice versa.
引用
收藏
页码:195 / 214
页数:20
相关论文
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