Fiscal decentralization and government size: An international test for Leviathan accounting for unmeasured economic activity

被引:19
作者
Anderson, JE [1 ]
Van den Berg, H [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA
关键词
Leviathan; fiscal centralization; size of government; unmeasured economic activity;
D O I
10.1023/A:1008690304663
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Tests for the presence of Leviathan, evidenced by a positive relationship between the size of government measured as a percentage of GDP, and the degree of fiscal centralization, have provided mixed results. We derive alternative measures of the size of government taking into account household and informal market activity. Traditional Leviathan models are then re-estimated for an international sample of forty-five countries. Controlling for income, population, intergovernmental grants, and urbanization we test whether fiscal centralization is responsible for the relative size of government. We find no evidence of a relationship between fiscal centralization and government size.
引用
收藏
页码:171 / 186
页数:16
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