Extraction Behaviour and Income Inequalities Resulting from a Common Pool Resource Exploitation

被引:6
作者
Owusu, Kwabena A. [1 ,2 ]
Kulesz, Micaela M. [4 ]
Merico, Agostino [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Leibniz Ctr Trop Marine Res ZMT, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
[2] African Inst Math Sci, Mbour 23000, Senegal
[3] Jacobs Univ Bremen, Dept Phys & Earth Sci, D-28759 Bremen, Germany
[4] Swedish Univ Agr Sci, Dept Econ, S-75007 Uppsala, Sweden
关键词
CPR; cooperative dependency ratio; distributional preferences; continuous time; renewable resource; artisanal fishery; SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION; ECONOMIC-INEQUALITY; COOPERATION; COMMUNICATION; DILEMMAS; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.3390/su11020536
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Using an experimental approach, we investigate income distribution among heterogeneous subjects exploiting a Common Pool Resource (CPR). The CPR experiments are conducted in continuous time and under different treatments, including combinations of communication and monitoring. While many studies have focused on how real-life income inequality affects cooperation and resource use among groups, here we examine the relationship between individuals' cooperative traits, harvest inequalities, and institutional arrangements. We found that: (1) When combined with monitoring, communication decreases harvest inequalitythat is, harvest is more equally distributed among individuals in all treatments; and (2) the cooperative trait of individuals significantly predicts harvest inequality. The relative proportion of non-cooperators and cooperators (i.e., the cooperative dependency ratio) drives the within-session harvest distributionas the cooperative dependency ration increases, the income distribution becomes increasingly unequal, leading to a downward spiral of resource overexploitation and scarcity. Finally, our results suggest that harvest and income inequalities are contingent to resource abundance, because under this regime, non-cooperators exert the greatest amount effortthus leading to resource scarcity and income inequalities.
引用
收藏
页数:13
相关论文
共 48 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 2002, The drama in the commons
[2]  
[Anonymous], THESIS
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1994, RULES GAMES COMMON P
[4]   Distributional preferences and competitive behavior [J].
Balafoutas, Loukas ;
Kerschbamer, Rudolf ;
Sutter, Matthias .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2012, 83 (01) :125-135
[5]   The ambiguous impact of inequality on local resource management [J].
Baland, JM ;
Platteau, JP .
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 1999, 27 (05) :773-788
[6]   Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review [J].
Balliet, Daniel .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 2010, 54 (01) :39-57
[7]   Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis [J].
Balliet, Daniel ;
Parks, Craig ;
Joireman, Jeff .
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS, 2009, 12 (04) :533-547
[8]   Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods [J].
Baumgaertner, Stefan ;
Drupp, Moritz A. ;
Meya, Jasper N. ;
Munz, Jan M. ;
Quaas, Martin F. .
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 2017, 85 :35-61
[9]   TIME HORIZON AND COOPERATION IN CONTINUOUS TIME [J].
Bigoni, Maria ;
Casari, Marco ;
Skrzypacz, Andrzej ;
Spagnolo, Giancarlo .
ECONOMETRICA, 2015, 83 (02) :587-616
[10]  
Bluffstone R., 2015, 7323 WPS WORLD BANK