The political economy of individual-level support for the basic income in Europe

被引:50
作者
Vlandas, Tim [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Oxford, England
关键词
Electoral politics; European Social Survey; guaranteed income; individual preferences; individual support; political economy; universal basic income; LABOR-MARKET POLICIES; WELFARE-STATE; SOCIAL-POLICY; INSTITUTIONAL TRUST; REDISTRIBUTION; PREFERENCES; IMMIGRATION; ATTITUDES; EQUALITY; PERCEPTIONS;
D O I
10.1177/0958928720923596
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
There is a long-standing debate in academic and policymaking circles about the normative merits and economic effects of a universal basic income (UBI). However, existing literature does not sufficiently address the question of which factors are associated with individual support for a UBI. While a large literature in political economy has focused on individual preferences for existing welfare state benefits, it has not analysed the case of a UBI. Using the eighth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), this article seeks to remedy this gap by analysing individual support for a UBI in 21 European countries. The findings from logistic regression analyses with country fixed effects are partly consistent with the expectations of previous social policy and political economy literatures. Younger, low-income, left-leaning individuals and the unemployed are more likely to support a UBI. Individuals with positive views of benefit recipients and/or high trust in political institutions are also more supportive, while anti-immigration attitudes are associated with lower support. By contrast, the patterns across occupations are mixed and male respondents appear slightly more supportive. Trade union membership is not statistically significant, perhaps because of contradictory effects: unions typically support new welfare state policies but they also have a key role in many existing welfare state schemes and may worry about individuals' attachment to the labour market. At the cross-national level, support tends to be higher where benefit activation is more pronounced and unemployment benefits less generous. These results suggest one possible reason why countries with high support for a UBI have not introduced it: the mixed support among the left means a pro-UBI coalition has to draw on right-wing voters who may support it only with lower taxes and/or extensive replacement of welfare state benefits, which in turn may further alienate parts of the left.
引用
收藏
页码:62 / 77
页数:16
相关论文
共 84 条
[1]  
Alesina Alberto., 2001, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P187, DOI DOI 10.3386/W8524
[2]   Job protection: The macho hypothesis [J].
Algan, Yann ;
Cahuc, Pierre .
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 2006, 22 (03) :390-410
[3]   Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve [J].
Algan, Yann ;
Cahuc, Pierre ;
Sangnier, Marc .
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 2016, 126 (593) :861-883
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2016, ANNUAL FATHERHOOD SURVEY
[5]  
[Anonymous], BASIC INCOME LEFT EU
[6]  
Barr, 2005, EC WELFARE STATE
[7]   Union inclusiveness and temporary agency workers: The role of power resources and union ideology [J].
Benassi, Chiara ;
Vlandas, Tim .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2016, 22 (01) :5-22
[8]   Trust, welfare states and income equality: Sorting out the causality [J].
Bergh, Andreas ;
Bjornskov, Christian .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2014, 35 :183-199
[9]   Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State [J].
Bergh, Andreas ;
Bjornskov, Christian .
KYKLOS, 2011, 64 (01) :1-19
[10]   Resource rents, universal basic income, and poverty among Alaska's Indigenous peoples [J].
Berman, Matthew .
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 2018, 106 :161-172