Peer effects;
Responsibility-alleviation;
Other-regarding behavior;
Gift exchange;
Experiment;
GIFT EXCHANGE;
FAIRNESS;
RECIPROCITY;
D O I:
10.1007/s12122-012-9138-9
中图分类号:
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号:
020106 ;
020207 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
A peer worker is introduced in a controlled labor market experiment characterized by unobservable effort and incomplete contracts. Workers make decisions independently and without knowledge of each other's actions in a modified gift exchange experiment. Introducing a peer worker into an ongoing market has a negative and significant effect on effort. This decrease in effort is consistent with responsibility-alleviation on the part of employees and not with other-regarding equity concerns for the manager's payoffs.