Dynamic Multicriteria Game with Pollution Externalities

被引:2
作者
Rettieva, Anna [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Qingdao Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Qingdao 266071, Peoples R China
[2] RAS, Karelian Res Ctr, Inst Appl Math Res, Pushkinskaya Str 11, Petrozavodsk 185910, Russia
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 俄罗斯科学基金会;
关键词
dynamic games; multicriteria games; resource management problem; pollution externalities; EQUILIBRIUM; MANAGEMENT; RESOURCES; COMMONS;
D O I
10.3390/math10224238
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
The multicriteria approach deals with real-life applications of game theory. However, the existing game-theoretic statements with the joint analysis of resource extraction and pollution dynamics have not considered the multiple objectives of the players. To address this issue, a dynamic multicriteria game is proposed: many players exploit a common resource and seek to optimize different criteria under pollution externalities. Two interconnected state variables (resource stock and pollution level) are introduced and studied. The pollution level depends on exploitation strategies, and the players have an environmental objective to reduce the accumulated pollution. The noncooperative and cooperative behavioral strategies of the players are analyzed. A linear dynamic multicriteria bioresource management problem with pollution externalities is investigated to illustrate the solution concepts proposed. The differences between the noncooperative and cooperative cases, as well as between the models with and without environmentally concerned players, are treated analytically and numerically. As shown by the results, the cooperative behavior reduces pollution in both statements, bringing to sparing bioresource exploitation.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 50 条
[21]   The land allocation game: Externalities and evolutionary competition [J].
Antoci, Angelo ;
Iannucci, Gianluca ;
Rocchi, Benedetto ;
Ticci, Elisa .
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2023, 64 :124-133
[22]   Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation [J].
de Frutos, Javier ;
Gaton, Victor ;
Lopez-Perez, Paula M. ;
Martin-Herran, Guiomar .
DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 2022, 12 (03) :813-843
[23]   Dynamic effects of consumption externalities [J].
Barbar, Riham ;
Ismael, Mohanad .
DECISIONS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2020, 43 (02) :725-750
[24]   Multicriteria coalitional game with choice from payoffs [J].
Ticha, Michaela .
34TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS (MME 2016), 2016, :857-862
[25]   Cooperative Multicriteria Dynamic Games: Application to Transportation Problems [J].
Rettieva, A. N. .
DOKLADY MATHEMATICS, 2024, 110 (SUPPL2) :S487-S494
[26]   Manufacturing and agricultural pollution, private mitigation and wage inequality in the presence of pollution externalities [J].
Wang, Dianshuang .
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS-ZEMEDELSKA EKONOMIKA, 2019, 65 (02) :51-58
[27]   Analysis of the Dynamic Evolution Game of Government, Enterprise and the Public to Control Industrial Pollution [J].
Yu, Na ;
Lu, Meilin .
SUSTAINABILITY, 2024, 16 (07)
[28]   MARKETS, EXTERNALITIES, AND THE DYNAMIC GAINS OF OPENNESS [J].
Monge-Naranjo, Alexander .
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2019, 60 (03) :1131-1170
[29]   Dynamic tax externalities and the US fiscal transformation [J].
Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin ;
Niepelt, Dirk .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 2020, 114 :144-158
[30]   Assessment and management of nonpoint source pollution based on multicriteria analysis [J].
Bi Wu ;
Xiang Zhang ;
Jing Xu ;
Jianfeng Liu ;
Fangliang Wei .
Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 2019, 26 :27073-27086