Dynamic Multicriteria Game with Pollution Externalities

The multicriteria approach deals with real-life applications of game theory. However, the existing game-theoretic statements with the joint analysis of resource extraction and pollution dynamics have not considered the multiple objectives of the players. To address this issue, a dynamic multicriteria game is proposed: many players exploit a common resource and seek to optimize different criteria under pollution externalities. Two interconnected state variables (resource stock and pollution level) are introduced and studied. The pollution level depends on exploitation strategies, and the players have an environmental objective to reduce the accumulated pollution. The noncooperative and cooperative behavioral strategies of the players are analyzed. A linear dynamic multicriteria bioresource management problem with pollution externalities is investigated to illustrate the solution concepts proposed. The differences between the noncooperative and cooperative cases, as well as between the models with and without environmentally concerned players, are treated analytically and numerically. As shown by the results, the cooperative behavior reduces pollution in both statements, bringing to sparing bioresource exploitation.