Growth-friendly fiscal rules? Safeguarding public investment from budget cuts through fiscal rule design

被引:29
作者
Ardanaz, Martin [1 ]
Cavallo, Eduardo [1 ]
Izquierdo, Alejandro [1 ]
Puig, Jorge [2 ]
机构
[1] Interamer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
[2] Natl Univ La Plata, La Plata, Argentina
关键词
Fiscal rules; Public investment; Fiscal consolidations; Spending cyclicality; POLICY; COMMITMENT; FLOWS; TALE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2020.102319
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study patterns of public investment behavior during fiscal consolidations in seventy-five advanced and emerging economies during 1990-2018 and find that results differ significantly depending on fiscal rule design. Fiscal rules can be flexible, meaning that they include mechanisms to accommodate exogenous shocks (e.g., cyclically adjusted fiscal targets, well-defined escape clauses, and differential treatment of investment expenditures) or rigid, meaning they establish numerical limits on fiscal targets without taking into account flexible features. We find that in countries with either no fiscal rule or with a rigid fiscal rule, a fiscal consolidation of at least 2 percent of GDP is associated with an average 10 percent reduction in public investment. Instead, in countries with flexible fiscal rules, the negative effect of fiscal adjustments on public investment vanishes, which implies that flexible rules protect public investment during consolidation episodes. The corollary is that the design of fiscal rules can add a growth-friendliness dimension to the fiscal sustainability objective that has typically been the focus of fiscal rules in the past, provided public investment is productive. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:17
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