The effect of securities class action lawsuits on mergers and acquisitions

被引：3

作者：

Basnet, Anup ^{[1
]}

Davis, Frederick ^{[1
]}

Walker, Thomas ^{[1
]}

Zhao, Kun ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, Dept Finance, 1450 Guy St, Montreal, PQ H3H 0A1, Canada

来源：

GLOBAL FINANCE JOURNAL | 2021年 / 48卷

关键词：

Securities class action litigation; Mergers and acquisitions; Takeovers; Takeover likelihood; SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION RIGHTS; TAKEOVER TARGETS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; VOTING-RIGHTS; MARKET; STOCK; FIRMS; RISK; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.gfj.2020.100556

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates whether shareholder class action litigation affects the takeover candidacy, premium, and completion rate of mergers and acquisitions involving defendant target firms. We use a comprehensive dataset of publicly traded U.S. firms that became the targets of takeover bids between 1998 and 2016 and find that firms subject to shareholder class action lawsuits within the previous two years are more likely to be targeted for acquisition while commanding a significantly higher premium. Firms that face such litigation after a takeover announcement experience a significant decrease in takeover completion.

引用

页数：20

共 108 条

[61] THE REPUTATIONAL PENALTY FIRMS BEAR FROM COMMITTING CRIMINAL FRAUD [J].