The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources

被引:5
作者
Cherry, Todd L. [1 ,2 ]
Cotten, Stephen J. [3 ]
Jones, Luke R. [4 ]
机构
[1] Appalachian State Univ, Dept Econ, Boone, NC 28608 USA
[2] CICERO Ctr Climate & Environm Res Oslo, N-0318 Oslo, Norway
[3] Univ Houston Clear Lake City, Dept Econ & Finance, Houston, TX 77058 USA
[4] Valdosta State Univ, Dept Mkt & Econ, Valdosta, GA 31698 USA
关键词
Common-pool resource; Experiment; Reciprocity; THRESHOLD PUBLIC-GOODS; COLLECTIVE ACTION; COOPERATION; PROVISION; DILEMMAS; INSTITUTIONS; REWARDS; CHOICE; RULES; GAMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.reseneeco.2013.03.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource provision leads to individual strategic behavior. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:329 / 341
页数:13
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