The Study of Acceptable Flood Risk Based on the Game Theory
被引:0
作者:
Wen, Wen
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Nanjing Univ, Sch Architecture & Urban Planning, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R ChinaNanjing Univ, Sch Architecture & Urban Planning, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
Wen, Wen
[1
]
Zhai, Guofang
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Nanjing Univ, Sch Architecture & Urban Planning, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R ChinaNanjing Univ, Sch Architecture & Urban Planning, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
Zhai, Guofang
[1
]
机构:
[1] Nanjing Univ, Sch Architecture & Urban Planning, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源:
INNOVATIVE THEORIES AND METHODS FOR RISK ANALYSIS AND CRISIS RESPONSE
|
2012年
/
21卷
关键词:
risk;
acceptable risk;
Game Theory;
Prisoner's Dilemma;
flood risk management;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号:
081104 ;
0812 ;
0835 ;
1405 ;
摘要:
As City Risk and Flood Risk increasing at an unprecedented speed, the study of the Acceptable Risk is extremely impending. In the paper, we tried to explore relationship between the relevant stakeholders within the analytical framework of the Game Theory. We used the non-cooperative model of "Prisoner's Dilemma" to analyze the internal mechanisms of different stakeholders, and eventually expanded the model into a game including the three subjects. The final aim was not only providing a scientific basis for the establishment of acceptable risk standards, but also improving the efficiency of flood investment and the risk management system.