The Study of Acceptable Flood Risk Based on the Game Theory

被引:0
作者
Wen, Wen [1 ]
Zhai, Guofang [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ, Sch Architecture & Urban Planning, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源
INNOVATIVE THEORIES AND METHODS FOR RISK ANALYSIS AND CRISIS RESPONSE | 2012年 / 21卷
关键词
risk; acceptable risk; Game Theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; flood risk management;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
As City Risk and Flood Risk increasing at an unprecedented speed, the study of the Acceptable Risk is extremely impending. In the paper, we tried to explore relationship between the relevant stakeholders within the analytical framework of the Game Theory. We used the non-cooperative model of "Prisoner's Dilemma" to analyze the internal mechanisms of different stakeholders, and eventually expanded the model into a game including the three subjects. The final aim was not only providing a scientific basis for the establishment of acceptable risk standards, but also improving the efficiency of flood investment and the risk management system.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 142
页数:6
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