Segmenting Two-Sided Markets

被引:18
作者
Banerjee, Siddhartha [1 ]
Gollapudi, Sreenivas [2 ]
Kollias, Kostas [2 ]
Munaga, kamesh [1 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[2] Google Res, Mountain View, CA USA
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB (WWW'17) | 2017年
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
online marketplaces; directed discovery; market segmentation; WELFARE; APPROXIMATION;
D O I
10.1145/3038912.3052578
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediates economic transactions between buyers and sellers. A common feature of many of these two-sided marketplaces is that the platform has full control over search and discovery, but prices are determined by the buyers and sellers. Motivated by this, we study the algorithmic aspects of market segmentation via directed discovery in two-sided markets with endogenous prices. We consider a model where an online platform knows each buyer/seller's characteristics, and associated demand/supply elasticities. Moreover, the platform can use discovery mechanisms (search, recommendation, etc.) to control which buyers/sellers are visible to each other. We develop efficient algorithms for throughput (i.e. volume of trade) and welfare maximization with provable guarantees under a variety of assumptions on the demand and supply functions. We also test the validity of our assumptions on demand curves inferred from NYC taxicab log-data, as well as show the performance of our algorithms on synthetic experiments.
引用
收藏
页码:63 / 72
页数:10
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