共 19 条
A Non-cooperative Mechanism Yielding the Nucleolus of Airport Problems
被引:4
作者:
Albizuri, M. J.
[1
]
Echarri, J. M.
[1
]
Zarzuelo, J. M.
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ Basque Country, Dept Appl Econ 4, Lehendakari Aguirre 83, Bilbao 48015, Spain
关键词:
Airport problem;
Non-cooperative mechanisms;
Nucleolus;
SHARING PROBLEMS;
GAME;
SURPLUS;
RULES;
D O I:
10.1007/s10726-017-9551-9
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, and it is shown that the SPE outcome payoffs coincide with those prescribed by the nucleolus of the corresponding airport cooperative game.
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页码:153 / 163
页数:11
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