Analysis of principal-agent model with game theory under the total contract mechanism

被引：0

作者：

Fuping, XP ^{[1
]}

Ren, YL ^{[1
]}

Lu, WZ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Chongqing Univ, Coll Econ & Business Adm, Chongqing 400044, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1 AND 2: MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND INNOVATION IN ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT | 2005年

关键词：

total contract mechanism; principal-agent; moral hazard; game theory;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

T [工业技术];

学科分类号：

08 ;

摘要：

The principal-agent relationship between general contractor and subcontractor is analyzed by applying "principal-agent theory" of game theory. Two types of principal-agent model are established according to different hypotheses, and the players' action and choices are analyzed. The incentive contract between general contractor and subcontractor, interior and exterior constraint mechanism as well as reputation effects play sufficient roles in reducing the moral hazard,which provide implications for healthy development of the secondary building market of China.

引用

页码：597 / 601

页数：5