EQUITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL

被引：37

作者：

Bosello, Francesco ^{[1
]}

Buchner, Barbara ^{[1
]}

Carraro, Carlo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Venice, I-30123 Venice, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2003年 / 1卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/154247603322391233

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions. A game-theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control. Then, the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model. Policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed. (JEL: C7, H0, H3, Q38)

引用

页码：601 / 611

页数：11

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