Abstract Non-Interference: A Unifying Framework for Weakening Information-flow

被引:23
作者
Giacobazzi, Roberto [1 ,2 ]
Mastroeni, Isabella [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Verona, Str Grazie 15, I-37134 Verona, Italy
[2] IMDEA SW Inst, Str Grazie 15, I-37134 Verona, Italy
关键词
Abstract interpretation; abstract domains; non-interference; closure operators; semantics; program analysis; language-based security; SYSTEM; MODEL;
D O I
10.1145/3175660
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Non-interference happens when some elements of a dynamic system do not interfere, i.e., do not affect, other elements in the same system. Originally introduced in language-based security, non-interference means that the manipulation of private information has no effect on public observations of data. In this article, we introduce abstract non-interference as a weakening of non-interference by abstract interpretation. Abstract non-interference is parametric on which private information we want to protect and which are the observational capabilities of the external observer, i.e., what the attacker can observe of a computation and of the data manipulated during the computation. This allows us to model a variety of situations in information-flow security, where the security of a system can be mastered by controlling the degree of precision of the strongest harmless attacker and the properties that are potentially leaked in case of successful attack.
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页数:31
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