Freedom of choice between unitary and two-tier boards: An empirical analysis

被引：33
作者：
Belot, Francois [1 ]
Ginglinger, Edith [2 ]
Sloyin, Myron B. [3 ]
Sushka, Marie E. [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] Univ Paris 09, DRM, F-75775 Paris 16, France
[3] HEC Paris, Jouy En Josas, France
[4] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 112卷 / 03期
关键词：
Board of directors; Two-tier board; Unitary board; Corporate governance; Monitoring; CORPORATE-OWNERSHIP; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; MANAGEMENT; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; LIQUIDITY; SIZE; TOP;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.011
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms the freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. Chief executive officer turnover is more sensitive to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater monitoring. Our results are broadly consistent with the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model and suggest that gains result from allowing freedom of contract about board structure. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：364 / 385
页数：22
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