Making Sense of One Dollar CEO Salaries

被引：14

作者：

Hamm, Sophia J. W. ^{[1
]}

Jung, Michael J. ^{[2
]}

Wang, Clare ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA

[3] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2015年 / 32卷 / 03期

关键词：

PERFORMANCE-MEASURES; EQUITY GRANTS; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS; FIRM;

D O I：

10.1111/1911-3846.12136

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the determinants and outcomes of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) accepting a $1 salary, a compensation practice that occurs relatively frequently in high-profile firms and is debated by regulators, investors, and the media. Using a hand-collected sample of 93 CEOs from 91 firms between 1993 and 2011, we examine the triggers preceding the $1 salary decision, the factors associated with the decision, subsequent stock returns, and the outcomes for the CEOs. Our evidence is consistent with two explanations for the phenomenon: (i) it is a gesture of sacrifice by CEOs of firms in crisis, and (ii) it is a signal of better future performance by CEOs of growing firms. Our analyses highlight the two different circumstances and shed light on an interesting debate that has thus far been supported only by anecdotal evidence.

引用

页码：941 / 972

页数：32

共 20 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2002, Forbes

[2]

[Anonymous], 2008, The Wall Street Journal

[3]

[Anonymous], 2011, NY TIMES

[4] MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES, MONITORING, AND RISK BEARING - A STUDY OF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, OWNERSHIP, AND BOARD STRUCTURE IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS [J].