The Price of Anarchy of Non-Uniform Altruism Traffic Assignment

被引：0

作者：

Yu, Xiao-Jun ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Guizhou Coll Finance & Econ, Sch Math & Stat, Guiyang 550004, Peoples R China

来源：

MATERIALS, MECHATRONICS AND AUTOMATION, PTS 1-3 | 2011年 / 467-469卷

关键词：

non-uniform altruism; price of anarchy; traffic assignment;

D O I：

10.4028/www.scientific.net/KEM.467-469.475

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

In this paper, assumed the users are partially altruistic, the altruism level of different user class has difference. The user's perceived cost assumed to be a linear combination of selfish component and altruistic component. A variational inequality (VI) model is investigated to formulate the user's route choice behavior in non-uniform altruism transportation network with fixed demand. The price of anarchy caused by this kind of behavior is analytically derived and this result takes some known results in the literature as its special cases.

引用

页码：475 / 480

页数：6

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