Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?

被引：21

作者：

Gruene, Stefanie ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2011年 / 19卷 / 03期

关键词：

Kant; concepts; non-conceptualism; intuition; synthesis; NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT;

D O I：

10.1080/09672559.2011.595196

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.

引用

页码：465 / 490

页数：26

共 21 条

[11] Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction [J].