Do less regulated markets attract lower quality firms? Evidence from the London AIM market

被引:20
|
作者
Nielsson, Ulf [1 ]
机构
[1] Copenhagen Business Sch, Dept Finance, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
关键词
Competition; Stock exchanges; Listing; Delisting; Regulation; SARBANES-OXLEY-ACT; FOREIGN; LEAVE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2012.11.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The paper examines whether the moderately regulated London AIM market is at a disadvantage in attracting high quality firms. The results show that firms listed on AIM are of the same quality level as firms listed in the US and in Continental Europe, albeit smaller in size. Furthermore, the delisting and valuation pattern is the same across markets, whereas AIM listed firms raise relatively more capital. Thus, rather than catering to low quality firms seeking to conceal their type, the AIM market attracts small firms that - due to - size face disproportional regulatory costs, but are otherwise equivalent to firms listing in more regulated markets. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:335 / 352
页数:18
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