InkTag: Secure Applications on an Untrusted Operating System

被引：107

作者：

Hofmann, Owen S. ^{[1
]}

Kim, Sangman ^{[1
]}

Dunn, Alan M. ^{[1
]}

Lee, Michael Z. ^{[1
]}

Witchel, Emmett ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

ACM SIGPLAN NOTICES | 2013年 / 48卷 / 04期

关键词：

Security; Verification; Application protection; Virtualization-based security; Paraverification;

D O I：

10.1145/2499368.2451146

中图分类号：

TP31 [计算机软件];

学科分类号：

081202 ; 0835 ;

摘要：

InkTag is a virtualization-based architecture that gives strong safety guarantees to high-assurance processes even in the presence of a malicious operating system. InkTag advances the state of the art in untrusted operating systems in both the design of its hypervisor and in the ability to run useful applications without trusting the operating system. We introduce paraverification, a technique that simplifies the InkTag hypervisor by forcing the untrusted operating system to participate in its own verification. Attribute-based access control allows trusted applications to create decentralized access control policies. InkTag is also the first system of its kind to ensure consistency between secure data and metadata, ensuring recoverability in the face of system crashes.

引用

页码：265 / 278

页数：14