A Fast Power Current Simulation of Cryptographic VLSI Circuits for Side Channel Attack Evaluation

被引:3
作者
Fujimoto, Daisuke [1 ]
Katashita, Toshihiro [2 ]
Sasaki, Akihiko [2 ]
Hori, Yohei [2 ]
Satoh, Akashi [3 ]
Nagata, Makoto [1 ]
机构
[1] Kobe Univ, Grad Sch Syst Informat, Kobe, Hyogo 6578501, Japan
[2] Natl Inst Adv Ind Sci & Technol, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058568, Japan
[3] Univ Electrocommun, Grad Sch Infomat & Engn, Chofu, Tokyo 1828585, Japan
基金
日本科学技术振兴机构;
关键词
power supply current; electromagnetic leakage; information leakage; AES; CMOS; RESISTANCE; NOISE;
D O I
10.1587/transfun.E96.A.2533
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Capacitor charging modeling accelerates the time-domain simulation of power current of cryptographic VLSI circuits in a CMOS technology. The model finely represents the amount of charges consumed during the operation of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cores in a variety of logical implementations, reflecting their internal logical activities. This approach significantly reduces the complexity of power current simulation, and accomplishes acceleration by a factor of more than 200 over the traditional transistor-level circuit simulation. The correlated power analysis (CPA) attack against AES cores is successfully simulated with a conventional circuit simulator, with the models individually derived for 10,000 different cipher texts. The CPA is also experimentally performed against AES cores fabricated in a 65 nm as well as 130 nm CMOS technologies, using SASEBO measurement standards. The fast power current simulation is demonstrated to be accurate enough to evaluate the vulnerability of AES cores in various logical implementations as well as in different technologies, and exhibits general agreements with the silicon measurements.
引用
收藏
页码:2533 / 2541
页数:9
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