Secondary Spectrum Trading-Auction-Based Framework for Spectrum Allocation and Profit Sharing

被引:29
作者
Chun, Sung Hyun [1 ]
La, Richard J. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Samsung Elect, Telecommun Div, Suwon 443742, South Korea
[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] Univ Maryland, Syst Res Inst, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Auction; cooperative game; mechanism design; pricing; profit sharing; secondary spectrum market; COGNITIVE RADIO; ACCESS;
D O I
10.1109/TNET.2012.2191418
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Recently, dynamic spectrum sharing has been gaining interest as a potential solution to scarcity of available spectrum. We investigate the problem of designing a secondary spectrum-trading market when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers and propose a general framework for the trading market based on an auction mechanism. To this end, we first introduce a new optimal auction mechanism, called the generalized Branco's mechanism (GBM). The GBM, which is both incentive-compatible and individually rational, is used to determine the assigned frequency bands and prices for them. Second, we assume that buyers of the spectrum are selfish and model their interaction as a noncooperative game. Using this model, we prove that when the sellers employ the GBM to vend their frequency bands, they can guarantee themselves the largest expected profits by selling their frequency bands jointly. Third, based on the previous finding, we model the interaction among the sellers as a cooperative game and demonstrate that, for any fixed strategies of the buyers, the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. This suggests that there exists a way for the sellers to share the profits from the joint sale of the spectrum so that no subset of sellers will find it beneficial to vend their frequency bands separately without the remaining sellers. Finally, we propose a profit-sharing scheme that can achieve any expected profit vector in the nonempty core of the cooperative game while satisfying two desirable properties.
引用
收藏
页码:176 / 189
页数:14
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