Illicit Authority and Its Competitors: The Constitution of Governance in Territories of Limited Statehood

This article examines how governance in territories of limited statehood (TOLS) subjected to `illicit authority' is constituted and whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could emerge as viable alternatives. Accordingly, it first proposes a constitutive framework for analyzing how an indeterminate actor-type assumes authority in TOLS, stipulating that public or private actors can institutionalize governance by asserting primacy in three contexts: coercive violence, socioeconomic security, and social legitimation. Second, Rio de Janeiro's favelas provide an empirical basis for investigating authority in TOLS, demonstrating that illicit authority derives from relative preeminence within the three contexts and thus enables the institutionalization of endogenous social order. The third section evaluates the feasibility of establishing NGO governance in TOLS by drawing empirically from ongoing state-led 'pacification' efforts in Rio's favelas. The pursuant analysis exposes NGOs' comparative disadvantage in the context of violence and thus proposes three 'hybrid structures' enabling NGOs to overcome this violence deficit. The conclusion indicates that primacy within the three governance contexts allows illicit authorities to establish institutions that sustain governance. NGOs, meanwhile, must first overcome their violence deficit to help enact competing institutional arrangements, reduce violence, and enhance human security in TOLS.