Determinants and effects of formal target agreements: an empirical investigation of German firms

被引:4
作者
Kampkoetter, Patrick [1 ]
Marggraf, Kathrin [1 ]
Zimmermann, Jan-Hendrik [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Seminar Personnel Econ & Human Resource Managemen, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
关键词
Target agreements; Firm performance; Personnel economics; HR management; HR practices; PERFORMANCE-APPRAISAL SYSTEMS; HUMAN-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; TASK MOTIVATION; PRODUCTIVITY; WORK; PAY; TURNOVER; IMPACT; GOALS;
D O I
10.1007/s11846-015-0177-5
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We investigate organizational determinants and performance effects of formal target agreements for employees based on the IAB establishment panel, a representative panel of German establishments. The results show that establishments with a high employee turnover rate, a large proportion of temporary workers, and a highly qualified workforce are significantly more likely to implement target agreements. Also, establishments with works councils installed are more likely to do so, controlling, among others, for firm size. Concerning organizational performance, we apply a first-difference and a fixed effects approach and find that establishments that implement target agreements achieve around 5 % higher total sales compared to firms that did not introduce this practice. Hence, organizations seem to benefit from the implementation of formal target agreements for employees.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 18
页数:18
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