Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment

被引:44
作者
Farhi, Emmanuel [1 ,2 ]
Sleet, Christopher [3 ]
Werning, Ivan [4 ]
Yeltekin, Sevin [3 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
[3] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[4] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
Capital taxation; Political economy; Progressivity; Mirrlees; H21; D72; D86; E61; GROWTH; REDISTRIBUTION; POLICY; INCOME; TAX; INCONSISTENCY; INEQUALITY; GOVERNMENT; ECONOMY; MODEL;
D O I
10.1093/restud/rds001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.
引用
收藏
页码:1469 / 1493
页数:25
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