Understanding contracts in evolving agro-economies: Fermers, dekhqans and networks in Khorezm, Uzbekistan

被引:14
作者
Djanibekov, Utkur [1 ]
Van Assche, Kristof [1 ,2 ]
Boezeman, Daan [3 ]
Djanibekov, Nodir [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bonn, Ctr Dev Res ZEF, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] Wageningen Univ, NL-6708 PB Wageningen, Netherlands
[3] Radboud Univ Nijmegen, Inst Management Res, NL-6500 HK Nijmegen, Netherlands
[4] Leibniz Inst Agr Dev Cent & Eastern Europe IAMO, D-06120 Halle, Saale, Germany
关键词
Agricultural contracts; Actor-networks; Institutional economics; Bimodal agricultural system; Transitional agricultural systems; MORAL HAZARD; CHOICE; GOVERNANCE; LESSONS; REFORM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jrurstud.2013.05.003
中图分类号
P9 [自然地理学]; K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ; 070501 ;
摘要
We combine institutional economic perspectives and actor-network theory to elucidate the role of contracts in the evolution of transitional agricultural systems. Such combination of theories can shed a light on the mutual constitution of actors and institutions, and the formation of economic strategies. We argue that forms and functions of contracts can only be understood in an evolutionary context. In a case study of the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan, where several waves of reform created two principal actors - commercial farms (called fermers locally) responsible for state-ordered production and semi-subsistence smallholders (called dekhqans locally) - it is demonstrated how in the self-transformation of the actor-network, and thus the shifts in forms and roles of contracts, several network features play a role: interdependencies between the actors, the essential actant of the irrigation and drainage system, formal/informal dialectics. Time horizons, risk/benefit calculations, trust and cooperation forms emerge in the self-reproducing network and leave space for certain contractual forms and functions. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 147
页数:11
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