Staggered boards, corporate opacity and firm value

被引:23
作者
Duru, Augustine [1 ]
Wang, Dechun [2 ]
Zhao, Yijiang [1 ]
机构
[1] American Univ, Kogod Sch Business, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[2] Texas A&M Univ, Mays Business Sch, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
关键词
Staggered boards; Antitakeover provisions; Corporate opacity; Performance; MANAGERIAL; INFORMATION; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.09.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We explore the effect of corporate opacity on the relation between staggered boards and firm value. We find that through mitigating takeover pressure, staggered boards become increasingly beneficial to firm value as opacity increases. In addition, we document that staggered boards reduce value only in transparent firms. Additional tests indicate that, as opacity increases, staggered boards bear an increasingly positive relation to research and development and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Taken together, these results suggest that corporate opacity affects the value impact of takeover protection. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:341 / 360
页数:20
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