Strategic R&D policy under vertically differentiated oligopoly

被引：25

作者：

Park, JH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wayne State Univ, Dept Econ, Detroit, MI 48202 USA

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 2001年 / 34卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/0008-4085.00108

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a high-tech firm and a low-tech firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated (high-quality and low-quality) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's product R&D activities. If the product market is under quantity competition, the results are opposite: an R&D subsidy (tax) incentive for the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government; and the high-tech firm's government always gains in the R&D policy game, in contrast to the standard prisoner's dilemma result of the R&D policy literature.

引用

页码：967 / 987

页数：21

共 18 条

[1] THE SENSITIVITY OF STRATEGIC AND CORRECTIVE R-AND-D POLICY IN BATTLES FOR MONOPOLY [J].