Electricity market game

被引:0
|
作者
Kubat, Jan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ, Prague 16500 6, Czech Republic
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS 2006 | 2006年
关键词
Electricity; model; market game; oligopoly; Nash equilibrium;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The regional oligopolistic model of the electricity market in the Czech Republic and its neighbor states is developed. Electricity producers are the players in this non-cooperative dynamic game. Their strategies are their productions, sales, bids on the cross-border auctions and corresponding cross-border flows of electricity and their investments into building new power plants in discrete time intervals. Each producer is maximizing its discounted profit, the excess between incomes from electricity sales and costs, where costs include electricity generation costs, bids on the cross-border auctions and investments costs, in each time interval. The main aim of the model is to describe and solve the competition in the cross-border auctions together with the classic oligopoly game of the electricity producers in each time interval and to show the time development on the supply side. The equilibrium solution is supposed to reach in every time interval and so in general too. For finding solution it is designed the iterative method according to the fictive game principle. This problem should have result in the unique pure Nash equilibrium. The demand of electricity is supposed to rise in all time intervals. For the model calibration there were used real numbers but also many approximations, that were determined with respect to obtained model solutions. The number of iteration depends on the initial values of all variables and so finding good initial values is one of the problems to be solved.
引用
收藏
页码:307 / 311
页数:5
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Bulgarian electricity market restructuring
    Ganev, Peter
    UTILITIES POLICY, 2009, 17 (01) : 65 - 75
  • [32] An overview of the Portuguese electricity market
    Ferreira, Paula
    Araujo, Madalena
    O'Kelly, M. E. J.
    ENERGY POLICY, 2007, 35 (03) : 1967 - 1977
  • [33] Bilateral Game Model of Power Supply and Demand Sides with Incomplete Information in Day-ahead Electricity Market
    Jiang W.
    Wu J.
    Feng W.
    Duan X.
    Tang H.
    Wu L.
    Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2019, 43 (02): : 18 - 24and75
  • [34] Equilibrium in a Market Game
    Yan-An Hwang
    Mau-Hsiang Shih
    Economic Theory, 2007, 31 : 387 - 392
  • [35] A double-sided non-cooperative game in electricity market with demand response and parameterization of supply functions
    Guo, Ningxuan
    Wang, Yinan
    Yan, Gangfeng
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS, 2021, 126
  • [36] OVERVIEW OF ELECTRICITY MARKET MONITORING
    Pinczynski, Marcin
    Kasperowicz, Rafal
    ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY, 2016, 9 (04) : 153 - 167
  • [37] A Dynamic Oligopolistic Electricity Market with Interdependent Market Segments
    Pineau, Pierre-Olivier
    Rasata, Hasina
    Zaccour, Georges
    ENERGY JOURNAL, 2011, 32 (04) : 183 - 217
  • [38] The impact of generator market power on the electricity hedge market
    Hesamzadeh, M. R.
    Biggar, D. R.
    Bunn, D. W.
    Moiseeva, E.
    ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2020, 86
  • [39] Market power and market games: Evidence from the Spanish electricity market
    Marques, V.
    Soares, I.
    Fortunato, A.
    2005 International Conference on Future Power Systems (FPS), 2005, : 681 - 686
  • [40] Effective market monitoring for surveillance of the Indian electricity market
    Bajpai, Prabodh
    Singh, Sri Niwas
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENERGY SECTOR MANAGEMENT, 2009, 3 (03) : 275 - 292