Electricity market game

被引:0
|
作者
Kubat, Jan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Econ, Prague 16500 6, Czech Republic
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS 2006 | 2006年
关键词
Electricity; model; market game; oligopoly; Nash equilibrium;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The regional oligopolistic model of the electricity market in the Czech Republic and its neighbor states is developed. Electricity producers are the players in this non-cooperative dynamic game. Their strategies are their productions, sales, bids on the cross-border auctions and corresponding cross-border flows of electricity and their investments into building new power plants in discrete time intervals. Each producer is maximizing its discounted profit, the excess between incomes from electricity sales and costs, where costs include electricity generation costs, bids on the cross-border auctions and investments costs, in each time interval. The main aim of the model is to describe and solve the competition in the cross-border auctions together with the classic oligopoly game of the electricity producers in each time interval and to show the time development on the supply side. The equilibrium solution is supposed to reach in every time interval and so in general too. For finding solution it is designed the iterative method according to the fictive game principle. This problem should have result in the unique pure Nash equilibrium. The demand of electricity is supposed to rise in all time intervals. For the model calibration there were used real numbers but also many approximations, that were determined with respect to obtained model solutions. The number of iteration depends on the initial values of all variables and so finding good initial values is one of the problems to be solved.
引用
收藏
页码:307 / 311
页数:5
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] A Decision Making Model of Chinese Coal-Electricity Market Based on Game Theory
    Wang Zhu-fang
    Xiong Jiu-feng
    FIRST IITA INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PROCEEDINGS, 2009, : 67 - 69
  • [22] Robust bidding strategy for demand response aggregators in electricity market based on game theory
    Abapour, Saeed
    Mohammadi-Ivatloo, Behnam
    Hagh, Mehrdad Tarafdar
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2020, 243 (243)
  • [23] A market game with symmetric limit orders
    Liao, Mouhua
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2016, 64 : 66 - 76
  • [24] Market Equilibrium and Impact of Market Mechanism Parameters on the Electricity Price in Yunnan's Electricity Market
    Cheng, Chuntian
    Chen, Fu
    Li, Gang
    Tu, Qiyu
    ENERGIES, 2016, 9 (06)
  • [25] Electricity market mergers with endogenous forward contracting
    Brown, David P.
    Eckert, Andrew
    JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 2017, 51 (03) : 269 - 310
  • [26] Investing in vertical integration: electricity retail market participation
    Fiuza de Braganca, Gabriel Godofredo
    Daglish, Toby
    ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2017, 67 : 355 - 365
  • [27] Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity markets
    Anderson, E. J.
    Cau, T. D. H.
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2011, 211 (02) : 403 - 414
  • [28] Equilibrium in a market game
    Hwang, Yan-An
    Shih, Mau-Hsiang
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2007, 31 (02) : 387 - 392
  • [29] Market power in electricity supply
    David, AK
    Wen, FS
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENERGY CONVERSION, 2001, 16 (04) : 352 - 360
  • [30] Market power in electricity supply
    David, AK
    Wen, FS
    2002 IEEE POWER ENGINEERING SOCIETY WINTER MEETING, VOLS 1 AND 2, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 2002, : 452 - 452