Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

被引:55
作者
Ambec, Stefan [1 ,2 ]
Coria, Jessica [2 ]
机构
[1] Toulouse Sch Econ INRA LERNA, Toulouse, France
[2] Gothenburg Univ, S-41124 Gothenburg, Sweden
关键词
Pollution; Environmental regulation; Policy mixes; Tax; Emission standard; Asymmetric information; AIR-POLLUTION; BENEFITS; COST;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2012.11.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:123 / 140
页数:18
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