FHA loan performance and adverse selection in mortgage insurance

被引:12
作者
Park, Kevin A. [1 ]
机构
[1] US Dept Housing & Urban Dev, Off Policy Dev & Res, 451 7th St SW,Room 8212, Washington, DC 20410 USA
关键词
Mortgage; Default; Insurance; Federal Housing Administration; Adverse selection; PROPENSITY SCORE; DEFAULT; MODEL; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.jhe.2016.07.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using propensity score matching and survival analysis, we examine the performance of FHA- and privately-insured home purchase mortgages relative to uninsured mortgages. Privately-insured loans are more likely to default than uninsured loans with comparable risk characteristics, indicating the presence of adverse selection. By contrast, loans insured by FHA are not more likely to default than similar uninsured loans. Hazard ratios for both insurance types fall when an adjusted rate spread variable, but does not eliminate the disparity between uninsured and privately-insured loans. On the other hand, privately insured loans are less likely to prepay while FHA-insured loans are more likely to prepay relative to uninsured loans. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:82 / 97
页数:16
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