Nonshareholder constituency statutes and shareholder wealth: A note

被引：11

作者：

Alexander, JC

Spivey, MF

Marr, MW

机构：

[1] CLEMSON UNIV,DEPT FINANCE,CLEMSON,SC 29634

[2] FINANCIAL ECON NETWORK,PFLUGERVILLE,TX 78660

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 1997年 / 21卷 / 03期

关键词：

takeover; constituency; security returns; legislation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0378-4266(96)00047-7

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We assess the effects of the introduction and passage of state nonshareholder constituency statutes on shareholder wealth. We find a small, but significantly negative effect on shareholder wealth for companies incorporated in states passing nonshareholder constituency statutes that did not already have corporate takeover defenses in place. Further, we find that firms that are poorly managed (as proxied by low market-to-book ratios) react more negatively to the statutes.

引用

页码：417 / 432

页数：16

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