共 22 条
- [21] THOMSON W, 1995, SOCIAL CHOICE WELFAR
- [22] THOMSON W, 1996, CONSISTENT ALLOCATIO
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
被引：34
作者：
Klaus, B
[1
]
Miyagawa, E
机构：
[1] Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词：
serial dictatorship;
strategy-proofness;
population-monotonicity;
consistency;
D O I：
10.1007/s001820100088
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.
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页码：421 / 435
页数：15
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