Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems

被引：34

作者：

Klaus, B ^{[1
]}

Miyagawa, E

机构：

[1] Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA

[2] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2002年 / 30卷 / 03期

关键词：

serial dictatorship; strategy-proofness; population-monotonicity; consistency;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820100088

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.

引用

页码：421 / 435

页数：15

共 22 条

[1] Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems
Abdulkadiroglu, A
Sonmez, T
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1998, 66 (03) : 689 - 701
[2] House allocation with existing tenants
Abdulkadiroglu, A
Sönmez, T
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1999, 88 (02) : 233 - 260
[3] VOTING BY COMMITTEES
BARBERA, S
SONNENSCHEIN, H
ZHOU, L
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (03) : 595 - 609
[4] EHLERS L, 2000, STRATEGY PROOFNESS P
[5] EHLERS L, 2000, RESOURCE MONOTONICIT
[6] EHLERS L, 2000, IN PRESS SOCIAL CHOI
[7] Consistency in house allocation problems
Ergin, HI
[J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 34 (01) : 77 - 97
[8] Hurwicz L., 1972, DECISION ORG, P297
[9] Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
Klaus, B
Peters, H
Storcken, T
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1997, 55 (03) : 339 - 346
[10] Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
Miyagawa, E
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 38 (02) : 347 - 361

← 1 2 3 →