Work hours and wage inequality: Evidence from the 2004 WERS

被引:3
|
作者
Carr, Michael D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02125 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 40卷 / 04期
关键词
Labor upply; Wage inequality; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; PROMOTION DYNAMICS; TOURNAMENTS; COMMITMENT; PAY; CONSTRAINTS; INCENTIVES; FAIRNESS; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper uses the 2004 wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey to test whether work hours and wage inequality are positively correlated because of financial incentives associated with inequality. Workers may work longer hours in order to increase their expected income through performance pay or promotion, resulting in a positive correlation between inequality and work hours. Contrary to other work, it is found that the relationship between wage inequality and the occupation and firm level and work hours cannot be attributed to the effect of financial incentives. Demand constraints faced by workers explains the positive correlation between occupation inequality and work hours attributed to financial incentives by others. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:417 / 427
页数:11
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