Game Analysis on Collaborative Quality Improvement of Supply Chain

Quality improvement plays a key role for customer's loyalty. Due to competition between enterprises shifting to competition between supply chains, the collaborative quality improvement of supply chain becomes a hot topic. In order to analyze how the core enterprise of supply chain promotes its partner's intention of improving quality and further enhances the collaboration of quality improvement in supply chain, this paper has constructed game models including one manufacturer and its two suppliers, and the equilibriums have been given. The result of this study indicates that if the manufacturer promises to continuously improve quality without a specific improvement scheme, and permits the suppliers to participate in the activities of manufacturer's quality improvement, the quality improvement of supply chain will be more effective. Furthermore, the benefit and risk sharing between the supplier and the manufacturer in the process of quality improvement is analyzed. It indicates that if the supplier believes it can predict the direction of quality improvement and can put forward design plans, it will risk its cooperation with other manufacturers which select price as purchasing standard.