Incomplete contracts, contingent fiduciaries and a director's duty to creditors

被引：0

作者：

Keay, Andrew ^{[1
]}

Zhang, Hao ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Leeds, Sch Law, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England

[2] Univ Leeds, Sch Business, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England

来源：

MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW | 2008年 / 32卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

[This article presents economic arguments for extending a limited form of fiduciary duty to creditors. It clarifies the two components of debtor firm opportunism against creditors: director-opportunism and shareholder-opportunism. The analysis, carried out within the economic perspective of incomplete contracts, focuses on three elements: incomplete contracts, self-interest seeking individuals and consequential ex post opportunism. The emphasis is on suggesting that the catalyst for a fiduciary duty is the presence of opportunistic behaviour, rather than arguing that it will depend on when a firm is in, near: or in danger of insolvency].

引用

页码：141 / 170

页数：30