Does National Culture Influence the Firm's Choice of Debt Maturity?*

被引:17
作者
Chang, Kiyoung [2 ]
Wee, Jung Bum [1 ]
Yi, Ha-Chin [3 ]
机构
[1] Kyung Hee Univ, Dept Management, Sch Management, Management Paradigm Ctr, Seoul 130701, South Korea
[2] Univ S Florida Sarasota Manatee, Coll Business, Sarasota, FL USA
[3] Texas State Univ San Marcos, McCoy Coll Business Adm, San Marcos, TX USA
关键词
Capital structure; Debt maturity; Corporate governance; National culture; G30; G32; G34; O16; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY COSTS; DETERMINANTS; OWNERSHIP; FINANCE; RISK; CONSEQUENCES; INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
10.1111/j.2041-6156.2012.01078.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Debt is an effective mechanism to mitigate agency costs in relieving managershareholder conflicts. Similarly, debt maturity choice allows the firm to discipline entrenched managers. In this paper we show cross-country evidence that national culture, along with corporate governance factors, influences the lenders (or the borrowers) debt maturity choice. Uncertainty avoidance index, masculinity, and long-term orientation indices are negatively related to overall debt maturity in a country. This implies that the risk-averse lenders offer (or, borrowing firms use) short-term debt when the surrounding economic environment becomes more uncertain and ambiguous. This is consistent with the extant literature that national culture plays a critical role in determining financing decisions in the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity. We argue that national culture is one of the last factors to influence the significant variation of debt maturities across firms in different countries. The relative effect of national culture and corporate governance on firms debt maturity selection depends on whether a countrys financial system is a bank-based economy (e.g. Japan and Germany) or a market-based economy (e.g. the US and the UK).
引用
收藏
页码:424 / 457
页数:34
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