A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain

被引：178

作者：

Esmaeili, M. ^{[1
]}

Aryanezhad, Mir-Bahador ^{[1
]}

Zeephongsekul, P. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Iran Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Ind Engn, Tehran, Iran

[2] RMIT Univ, Sch Math & Geospatial Sci, Melbourne, Vic, Australia

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | 2009年 / 195卷 / 02期

关键词：

Cooperative and non-cooperative game; theory; Marketing; Pricing; Seller-buyer supply chain; OPTIMAL INVENTORY POLICIES; DECREASING COST-FUNCTIONS; CHANNEL COORDINATION; MODELS; PRICE; MANAGEMENT; DEMAND;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejor.2008.02.026

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In this paper, several seller-buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. The non-cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strategy solution concept, where we consider separately the case when the seller is the leader (Seller-Stackelberg) and also when the buyer is the leader (Buyer-Stackelberg). Pareto efficient solutions will be provided for the cooperative game model. Numerical examples presented in this paper, including sensitivity analysis of some key parameters, will compare the results between different models considered. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：442 / 448

页数：7

共 32 条

[1] SUPPLIER PRICING AND LOT-SIZING WHEN DEMAND IS PRICE SENSITIVE [J].