The subjectivist interpretation of probability and the problem of individualisation in forensic science

被引：27

作者：

Biedermann, Alex ^{[1
]}

Garbolino, Paolo ^{[2
]}

Taroni, Franco ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Lausanne, Sch Criminal Justice, Lausanne, Switzerland

[2] IUAV, Venice, Italy

来源：

SCIENCE & JUSTICE | 2013年 / 53卷 / 02期

关键词：

Subjective probability; Decision theory; Scoring rule; Individualisation; BAYESIAN NETWORKS; DNA; IDENTIFICATION; INFERENCE; RELEVANCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.scijus.2013.01.003

中图分类号：

DF [法律]; D9 [法律]; R [医药、卫生];

学科分类号：

0301 ; 10 ;

摘要：

This paper presents and discusses further aspects of the subjectivist interpretation of probability (also known as the 'personalist' view of probabilities) as initiated in earlier forensic and legal literature. It shows that operational devices to elicit subjective probabilities - in particular the so-called scoring rules - provide additional arguments in support of the standpoint according to which categorical claims of forensic individualisation do not follow from a formal analysis under that view of probability theory. (C) 2013 Forensic Science Society. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：192 / 200

页数：9

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