Partners or rivals? An experimental study of a two-stage tournament

被引：1

作者：

Chao, Hong ^{[1
]}

Ho, Chun-Yu ^{[2
]}

Huang, Shaoqing ^{[3
]}

Qin, Xiangdong ^{[3
]}

Cong, Jiajia ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] East China Normal Univ, Sch Econ, Fac Econ & Management, Dept Finance, 3663 North Zhongshan Rd, Shanghai 200062, Peoples R China

[2] SUNY Albany, Dept Econ, New York, NY 12222 USA

[3] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, 1954 Huashan Rd, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China

[4] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Dept Ind Econ, 670 Guoshun Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2019年 / 158卷

关键词：

Two-stage tournament; Alliance; Hold-up problem; Appropriation; Informal agreement; SOCIAL APPROVAL; GROUP IDENTITY; PUBLIC GOOD; LEND-LEASE; CHEAP TALK; COOPERATION; COMMUNICATION; COORDINATION; COMPETITION; OWNERSHIP;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.023

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a two-stage tournament in which two alliances compete in stage one. Members of the winning alliance then compete against each other in stage two. Members' investment in stage one could increase their alliance's winning probability, but could also be appropriated and used against them by their partners-turned-rivals in stage two. This hold-up problem creates a negative incentive for within-alliance cooperation. We test this theoretical benchmark in an experiment. In a second experiment, we investigate whether ex-ante informal agreements deter appropriation. We find that such agreements are honored, and thus encourage investments, only under the fixed matching condition. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：288 / 310

页数：23

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