The role of strategic threats in refugee resettlement - The Indochinese crisis of 1978-79

被引:3
作者
Zeager, LA [1 ]
机构
[1] E Carolina Univ, Dept Econ, Greenville, NC 27858 USA
关键词
game theory; refugees; Southeast Asia; strategic threats; theory of moves;
D O I
10.1177/1043463102014002002
中图分类号
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号
030301 ; 1204 ;
摘要
The Indochinese refugee crisis of 1978-79 is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma, with Thailand choosing whether to permit first asylum and the United States choosing whether to allow resettlement. A threat power analysis from the theory of moves helps to explain: (1) the threats by Thailand and other countries in the region to deny first asylum, and (2) the decision by the United States to (eventually) accept over 750,000 refugees for resettlement. The threats by Thailand shocked and outraged the international community. but the threat power analysis Suggests that they were instrumental in escaping the prisoners' dilemma.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / 191
页数:33
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