Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid

被引：78
作者：
Chang, Ruth [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Philosophy, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 USA
来源：
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2013年 / 164卷 / 01期
关键词：
Normative Fact; Hard Case; Moral Fact; Reason Problem; Normative Source;
D O I：
10.1007/s11098-013-0092-z
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：163 / 187
页数：25
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