Emissions reduction allocation and economic welfare estimation through interregional emissions trading in China: Evidence from efficiency and equity

被引:61
作者
Chang, Kai [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Zhang, Chao [1 ]
Chang, Hao [5 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Hangzhou 310038, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ, Sch Business, Nanjing 210093, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, China Acad Financial Res, Hangzhou 310038, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[4] Ctr Res Regulat & Policy Zhejiang Prov, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China
[5] Tianjin Polytech Univ, Sch Sci, Tianjin 300387, Peoples R China
关键词
Shapley value method; Emissions reduction allocation; Emissions trading scheme; Economic welfare; Equity; Efficiency; CARBON-DIOXIDE EMISSIONS; CO2; EMISSIONS; SCHEME; IMPACTS; COMPETITIVENESS; PERFORMANCE; ABATEMENT; TARGETS; UNCERTAINTIES; COMPENSATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.energy.2016.07.113
中图分类号
O414.1 [热力学];
学科分类号
摘要
Establishing an equal and effective emissions trading system is a long-term strategy to promote sustainable environmental protection and stronger economic growth. Due to regional divergences in economic development, resource endowment and geographical CO2 emissions space, this paper focuses on a comprehensive emissions reduction allocation solution based on the Shapley value method and estimating economic welfare effects through interregional emissions trading in China. Our empirical results verify that the Shapley value-based allocation criterion is an equal and effective emissions reduction target allocation. The Eastern and Southern coast, and the Northeastern and Middle Yellow River regions are the main emissions permit buyers, and they incur windfall economic losses because of greater marginal abatement cost, while the Southwest, Northwest, Northern coast and Middle Yangtze River regions are the main emissions permit sellers, and they earn windfall economic benefits because of the emissions reduction potential of energy-intensive industries. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1125 / 1135
页数:11
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