Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value

被引:2
作者
Du, Yanhua [1 ,2 ]
Fang, Jun [1 ]
Zhang, Jingxiao [3 ]
Hu, Jun [1 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Civil Engn & Architecture, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China
[2] Zhengzhou Univ Aeronaut, Sch Civil Engn & Architecture, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China
[3] Changan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Xian 710061, Peoples R China
来源
SYMMETRY-BASEL | 2020年 / 12卷 / 06期
关键词
shapley value; fuzzy payment; investment ratio; risk-sharing ratio; revenue sharing; DECISION-MAKING; CHOOSE; GAMES; MODEL;
D O I
10.3390/sym12060882
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In recent years, China's government has encouraged the adoption of the TOT (Transfer-Operate-Transfer) model to realize the marketization of China's public service stock projects. The TOT model is a cooperation mechanism through sharing investment, revenue and risks between the government and private partner. Therefore, a fair and reasonable revenue sharing method (RSM) is the key to the success of the TOT project. This paper aims to provide a fair and reasonable RSM based on a modified Shapley value with a triangular symmetric fuzzy structure element, which has better motivation, flexibility, forecasting function and dynamic precise distribution function. According to the factors that affect revenue sharing, the Shapley value is improved with initial correction coefficient composed of investment ratio, risk-sharing ratio, execution degree, and fuzzy payment to achieve fairness and reasonableness. The methodology is illustrated by a case study of a TOT project selected from Laohekou city of Hubei province, China. The results testify that the revenue-sharing ratios of participants is positively correlated with the initial correction coefficient, which make the RSM more motivating; and the Shapley value with fuzzy payment by using triangular symmetric fuzzy element function make the RSM more flexible, and it has both forecasting function and precise dynamic distribution function under project revenue uncertainty.
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页数:19
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