Strategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence

被引：1

作者：

Romero-Medina, Antonio ^{[1
]}

Triossi, Matteo ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Carlos III Univ Madrid, Dept Econ, Madrid, Spain

[2] Univ Chile, Ctr Appl Econ, Dept Ind Engn, Santiago, Chile

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2020年 / 16卷 / 03期

关键词：

multi-unit demand; stability; strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; ASSIGNMENT;

D O I：

10.1111/ijet.12214

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.

引用

页码：349 / 354

页数：6

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